The ordinary Latin words for ‘lonian’ are lonicus and lonius. Ovid does not use the former at all, and except for one problematical instance applies the latter only to the Ionian Sea . Copyists, editors, and lexicographers, however, credit him, and him only, with Ioniacus, supposedly attested in two passages of almost identical wording.

This volume grew out of work on Berkeley which was presented in a dissertation several years ago. Though now much revised and greatly expanded. particularly in respect of the theory of concepts, a good part of the present text rests on this earlier foundation. I therefore gladly take this opportunity to express my appreciation to my teachers both at Indiana University and at McGill, and especially to Professor Newton Stallknecht who directed my dissertation. For permission to quote from the Berkeley (...) manuscripts in their keeping, I have first to thank the Trustees of the British Museum, and the Board of Trinity College Dublin. I wish further to thank the Bodleian Library, Oxford for allowing me to quote from their collection of Locke manu scripts. Also I am grateful to the Editor of Filoso/ia for letting me use excerpts from an article that first appeared in the Stu'di Internazionali di Filoso/ia, and to George Allen and Unwin. Publishers, for permission to quote a long passage from Bertrand Russell's Analysis 0/ Mind. From thesis project to published book, my research on the Berkeley manuscripts has been made possible by the generous and timely support of the Canada Council. Finally. I wish to thank Mrs. Anne Hillier for preparing the manuscript with great patience and skill. (shrink)

Ratom pʻilosopʻia, rogorcʻ kritikuli azrovnebis gamocʻdileba -- Kritikuli azrovnebis metʻodis żiritʻadi kitʻxvebi -- Kritikuli azrovnebis metʻodis żiritʻadi debulebebi.

This edition of Ia IIae pp. 49-67 of the Summa is competent, inexpensive, and complete, and so marks a welcome first in editions of this part of the Summa. After a discussion of habits in general, or what in contemporary philosophy of mind would be more familiar under the rubric of dispositions, virtue is located as a specific sort of habit in the soul, i.e., man, considered according to his real, intrinsic principle of activity. Next St. Thomas moves to a (...) general consideration of the "Intellectual Virtues", the "Moral Virtues", the "Cardinal Virtues", and the "Theological Virtues". Finally, St. Thomas runs back over this basic classification by considering "The Cause of Virtue", "The Mean of Virtue", "The Connection of the Virtues", "The Equality of the Virtues", and "The Duration of the Virtues after this Life". This book has obvious historical interest. But it is also important for contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind. For example, even if we defer to the caveat that the theological points made by St. Thomas may be gratuitous, it is interesting to consider if those contemporary philosophers of mind who display a decided tendency to explain dispositions in terms of overt, occurrent episodes could come anywhere near adequately describing, let alone explaining, the mine of distinctions vis-à-vis just the moral, intellectual, and cardinal virtues, which Aquinas both describes in ordinary language and neatly explains by means of a theoretical framework containing a thoroughly metaphysical doctrine of potentiality.—E. A. R. (shrink)

Competent, inexpensive translations of complete sections of the Summa are as rare as they are needed. Unfortunately this particular edition fails in the area of completeness. The whole of questions 5, 17, 23, 24, and 26 plus a total of thirty eight articles from the other questions in the first section of the Prima Pars have been left out. Parts of Ia qq. 44-46 have been included, but this is not enough to recommend this edition over the Pegis edition of (...) Ia pp. 1-26, which is now in paper also.—E. A. R. (shrink)

In this Interview, Professor Robert B. Brandom answered ten detailed questions about his philosophy of Rational Pragmatism and Semantic Expressivism, grouped into four topics. 1. Metaphysics and Anthropology, 2. Pragmatics and Semantics, 3. Epistemic Expressivism and 4. Philosophy of Logic. With his careful answers Professor Brandom offers many additional insights into his rigorously constructed account of the relationship “between what we say and think, and what we are saying and thinking about” around the human practice of asking for and giving (...) reasons. A final, additional question pointed at a principal motivation for putting together the present issue: how to reconcile Wittgenstein’s assertion that philosophy must not proffer any theories with the very explicit system of explanations Brandom has constructed. This same issue is addressed to some extent already in Professor Brandom’s new article contained in this issue, but his answer, asserting that he does not proffer a theory but only makes explicit what is already there, might be seen as an unambiguous statement of the continuous presence of a contested Wittgensteinian principle in Brandom’s work. (shrink)

Reúne textos sobre a história e seu objeto, desde o século XVII até a contemporaneidade, compondo uma amostragem do que se tem trabalhado no âmbito da filosofia da história, mais expressivamente no Brasil.

Esta obra visa mostrar os conflitos sobre a língua nacional causados pelo funcionamento político do simbólico, durante o governo de JK - anos 50 do século XX.

The development of Artificial Intelligence has led to many controversies of philosophical interest involving issues of logic, computer science, software engeneering. The paper goes through the main steps of this development, deals with their philosophical relevance and sketches the unsolved problems, with special emphasis on the AI models of semantic competence. Some criticisms raised to such models in AI, either in its “classical” or “neural networks” format, are examined. On the ground of the discussion of these criticisms, a view is (...) proposed which avoids the inherited gap between the project of AI and naturalistic philosophy and suggests that filling the gap also provides a filter in order to select a definite form of naturalism. (shrink)

Introdução: Apontamentos para a biografia de Amoroso Costa, por A. Gerhardt Santos.--A obra de Amoroso Costa, por L. Gama.--O neopositivismo no Brasil. Período de formação corrente, por A. Paim.--Conferências, ensaios e artigos do período 1918/1922.--Artigos dos anos de 1923 e 1928 e conferência, comemorativa do bicentenário de Kant (1924).--As idéias fundamentais da matemática.

Este livro pretende ser um convite à leitura das obras de Álvaro Vieira Pinto. Chama-se 'Esperança e democracia' porque no núcleo do pensar desse, que foi o mais consistente filósofo do nacionalismo brasileiro, estão a esperança - o ânimo de quem não teme o destino e quer projetar no mundo as marcas da sua vontade - e a democracia, o regime político dos homens comuns.

“If you find it strange that, in setting out these elements, I do not use those qualities called heat, cold, moistness, and dryness, as do the philosophers, I shall say to you that these qualities appear to me to be themselves in need of explanation. Indeed, unless I am mistaken, not only these four qualities, but also all the others (indeed all the forms of inanimate bodies) can be explained without the need of supposing for that purpose any other thing (...) in their matter than the motion, size, shape, and arrangement of its parts.” So does Descartes, in his The World, or Treatise on Light [Le Monde ou Traité de la Lumière], express the uniphenomenal principle of the physical world, which is the basis - or foundation - of his great cosmic synthesis. The uniphenomenal character of Cartesian physics - namely, explaining all phenomena and appearances from a single primordial phenomenon (and substance) - has such a great semantic and intuitive value for the structure of the human mind that Plato, even before Aristotle’s hyle, had come to contemplate his concept of chora, the cosmic and universal matrix at the base of all phenomena, existing before and beyond the coming into existence of the elements and of sensible things. Even the physics of Democritus is uniphenomenal. A perfect example of uniphenomenal physics in our time is the Spacio-fluido-dynamics of the scientist Marco Todeschini (Bergamo, 1899 - 1988) who, with his monumental Teoria delle apparenze [Theory of Appearances] of ’49 tried to clear a path towards the hope of reaching a Cartesian kind of unified cosmic synthesis. (We accept only the fundamental concept of Todeschi’s theory here, that is, the uniphenomenal character of his physics, without occupying ourselves with criteria such as the value or the plausibility of his hypotheses.) This concept of uniphenomenal physics will serve as an ultra-clear instrument to dissipate the epistemological fog of AI (Artificial Intelligence). (shrink)